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Speculative housebuilding in the United Kingdom faces an ever tighter regulatory environment, 
owing to the increasing impact of the sustainable development agenda. For example, 60% of all 
new homes in England are now expected to be constructed on previously-developed land or 
provided through the conversion of existing buildings. Since speculative housebuilders are 
responsible for about 80% of all new dwellings built in the UK, the achievement of this important 
Government target is critically dependent on the private sector’s capacity and willingness to 
respond to public policy. By exploring the main components of the residential development 
process, the paper investigates how far speculative housebuilding will be need to change to ensure 
the successful implementation of the Government’s brownfield housing target. It suggests that 
those speculative housebuilders who are enthusiastically building up core competencies in 
brownfield housing are likely to emerge as the market leaders of the future, while those companies 
who continue to rely on past practices and technologies will face an uncertain future as greenfield 





Speculative housebuilders are now responsible for about 80% of all new homes built in the UK 
(Nicol and Hooper, 1999). Over the years, speculative housebuilding has grown and prospered 
primarily through the conversion of greenfield land into new housing estates. The Government’s 
desire to switch the balance of residential development increasingly to brownfield sites represents 
a significant challenge to behaviour and attitudes that have become well established in much of 
speculative housebuilding sector. Although matched, for instance, by stricter design and energy 
efficiency requirements, the brownfield housing target provides the best known example of the 
ever tighter regulatory environment that speculative housebuilders now face as a result of the 
sustainable development agenda. 
 
In this context, this paper investigates the close inter-relationship between public policy change 
and private business strategy in residential development. In conceptualising this relationship, it 
would be mistaken to characterise the residential development process as driven by market forces 
constantly seeking to elude state regulation. Such an antagonistic view of state-market relations 
fails to recognise how new housing development has historically reflected different patterns of 
state-market mix, which have shaped producer and consumer behaviour over different periods. 
Indeed, the richly entwined connections between markets, state structures, legal systems, moral 
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codes and business organisations make it pointless to counterpoise ‘free’ markets and constraining 
institutions in seeking to explain housing development (Barlow and Duncan, 1994). 
 
Traditionally, British housebuilders have reaped substantial profits from greenfield sites with 
relatively easy physical conditions, mainly because the state has long permitted and indeed 
encouraged extensive development of owner-occupied housing on greenfield land. Now that 
government policy has changed in apparent accordance with the sustainable development agenda, 
some housebuilders argue that the problematic condition of brownfield sites makes public subsidy 
necessary to encourage their participation in its redevelopment. In the longer term, however, this 
paper suggests that the emergence of a more innovative structure of provision for owner-occupied 
housing, which is both responsive to the sustainable development agenda and conducive to 
concentrating on brownfield development, is likely to require substantial change in the business 
strategies of speculative housebuilders. 
 
Success in the private housing development process has long depended on the essential skills of 
acquiring land, securing planning permission and marketing the completed development 
effectively. Although these activities are equally important in brownfield and greenfield locations, 
the necessary approaches, skills and expertise are likely to vary significantly between these types of 
location. The paper therefore explores the concept of core competencies found in the strategic 
management literature and suggests that housebuilders who regard brownfield development as a 
major business opportunity for the future cannot rely merely on translating competencies learnt 
from greenfield experience but must seek instead to build up the specific competencies needed for 
brownfield development. More significantly, if greenfield development opportunities become ever 
more limited, companies that fail to make this switch are likely to face an uncertain business future. 
 
The next section reviews the main changes in the regulatory environment of speculative 
housebuilding which have taken place over the past decade. It seeks to relate them to the changing 
role of the state and to the contested nature of sustainable development. Section 3 draws into 
some of the essential ideas from the strategic management literature that offer companies advise 
on how best to react to, or rather to anticipate major changes in their external operating context. 
This provides the basis in the following section to review how conventional business strategies in 
speculative housebuilding have been largely driven by the ease or difficulty of access to greenfield 
development sites. Section 5 then unwraps the brownfield development process as a means of 
identifying the kind of competencies that the housebuilding sector will need to build up, if it is to 
make a significant and lasting contribution to delivering the government’s policy target. In Section 
6, the implications of this range of competencies for the future structure of the sector are 
examined, with the suggestion made that policy delivery might engender and indeed welcome some 
measure of restructuring. The concluding section offers some final comments on the likely 
relationship between structural change in the housebuilding sector and the future evaluation and 
evolution of British housing land policy. 
 
2. THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
Since market regulation establishes the parameters of risk and uncertainty in speculative 
housebuilding, the competitive strategies of individual developers are strongly influenced by 
particular forms of state intervention (Barlow and King, 1992). Significant changes in the 
regulatory environment for UK housebuilding since the early 1990s have made the sector’s well-
established paths to profitability increasingly different and helped generate a fundamental re-think 
of its traditional modus operandi. Although the sector is engaged in what many see as an exciting 
period of change, turbulence in the policy environment has intensified risk and uncertainty in 
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housebuilding (at least in the short term) and exacerbated the unpredictability of its corporate 
transformation. 
 
This section first concentrates on the most prominent policy switch of recent years: namely, the 
emerging requirements for more and more new housing development to be located on brownfield 
rather than greenfield land. However, in recognition that locational control is not the only 
regulatory regime to have recently become more demanding, attention is also given to the more 
rigorous state expectations in terms of the design and energy efficiency of new housing, as well as 
the increasing state desire for such development to yield affordable housing or other community 
benefits. 
 
During the 1990s, UK housing land policy gradually evolved under governments of both political 
persuasions from one that saw its priority as meeting housing demand, even if that involved 
substantial greenfield development, to one that initially adopted a 50% target for new housing on 
re-used land in England, toyed with the idea of increasing this to 75% and eventually settled on a 
compromise of 60%. This reflects the fact that, despite considerable variation in research findings 
(see, for example, Breheny et al., 1993; Jenks et al., 1996; Williams et al., 2000), “government and 
many planners consider that use of brownfield sites and the general maintenance of existing 
settlement boundaries is the key to sustainable development” (Macnaghten and Pinfield, 1999, p. 
44)1. 
 
In 1995, following initial debate, the Conservative Government announced that it wished to see 
half of all new homes in England built on re-used sites (DOE, 1995). After much controversy, the 
incoming Labour Government resolved in 1998 that a more ambitious commitment should be 
made. Accordingly: “The national target is that by 2008, 60% of additional housing should be 
provided on previously-developed land and through the conversion of existing buildings” (DETR, 
2000a, para 23). Officially, this target applies only to England. Although planning policy in 
Scotland and Wales far prefers the re-use of vacant and derelict land to greenfield development, 
no official target for brownfield development has been set. 
 
Among those who considered even a 60% target too low, perhaps the most authoritative voice 
was that of the UK Round Table on Sustainable Development (1997) who argued for a 75% 
aspirational target in England and for similarly challenging targets in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. The Council for the Protection of Rural England (1997a, 1997b) along with other 
 
1 It is commonly accepted in the UK that brownfield land can be either derelict or vacant (Syms, 1994, Urban 
Task Force, 1999, Alker et al., 2000), although some have also argued that brownfield land must be capable 
of redevelopment in accordance with planning policies or urban renewal objectives (Syms, 2001). In this 
paper, I use the term ‘brownfield’ as shorthand for the official concept of ‘previously-developed land’ 
contained in PPG 3 (DETR, 2000a). According to this definition, previously-developed land: 
• is or was occupied by a permanent structure (excluding agricultural or forestry buildings), and associated 
fixed surface infrastructure; 
• occurs in both built-up and rural settings; 
• includes defence buildings and land used for mineral extraction and waste disposal where provision for 
restoration has not been made through development control procedures; 
• excludes land and buildings that are currently in use for agricultural or forestry purposes, and land in 
built-up areas which has not been developed previously (e.g. parks, recreation grounds, and allotments, 
even though these areas may contain certain urban features such as paths, pavilions and other buildings); 
• excludes land that was previously developed but where the remains of any structure or activity have 
blended into the landscape in the process of time (to the extent that it can reasonably be considered as 
part of the natural surroundings), and where there is a clear reason that could outweigh the re-use of the 
site (such as its contribution to nature conservation) or where it has subsequently been put to an amenity 
use and cannot be regarded as requiring redevelopment. 
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environmental groups supported this more ambitious target. In contrast, however, the Town and 
Country Planning Association (1997) consistently questioned the wisdom and practicality of raising 
the English target from 50% to 60%. 
 
Close examination of the precise wording of the Government’s target reveals three interesting 
features. First, it makes no distinction between previously-developed land in urban and rural areas. 
In 1995, for example, although 53% of all new dwellings in England were built on previously-
developed land, almost 13% were located in rural areas and just under 41% in urban areas (DETR, 
1998a). Redevelopment of mineral, landfill and defence sites for housing in rural areas therefore 
contributes to the target, even if such sites are located in open country. It is thus not surprising 
that House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee (1999) argued 
that the Government should “aim to concentrate development on brownfield sites in appropriate 
urban locations. Accordingly as we have frequently recommended, it should set a target for the re-use 
of brownfield sites in urban areas” (Recommendation (w) of 11th report). 
 
Secondly, new dwellings produced through the conversion of existing buildings contribute to meeting 
the Government’s 60% target. No annual statistics are available for such conversions, instead, the 
Government estimates that they add about 3% to the proportion of new dwellings built on previously-
developed land. Alternatively, in comparison with the previous Conservative Government’s target of 
50% of all new homes to be built on re-used sites, it could be said that incoming Labour Government 
raised the figure to only 57% and not 60%. 
 
Finally, the policy focuses on the relative proportion of brownfield redevelopment and conversions 
creates the paradoxical possibility that Ministers can claim success, even if the absolute amount of 
land recycled falls, for example, as a result of a slowdown in housebuilding2. This suggests that too 
much concentration on targets and potential capacities may serve to distract attention from what 
needs to be done in practice to promote more brownfield housing development. Nevertheless, as 
Table 1 shows, the Secretary of State, in finalising ‘new style’ regional planning guidance in England, 
has regularly raising the proportion of new dwellings required to be built on previously-developed 
land or provided through conversions above the draft figures previously submitted by the regional 
planning bodies (which comprise largely of local authorities within the particular region acting 
collectively). 
 
Over recent years, a forceful array of policy guidance and best practice advice has also emerged 
which suggests that the poor standard of housing design evident in the past is likely to prove less 
acceptable in the future. This theme can be traced back to the previous Conservative Government 
who argued that public disenchantment with the products of speculative housebuilding, and in 
particular with ugly development that makes places seem just like everywhere else, was an 
important component behind the growing public resistance to greenfield encroachment 
(Department of the Environment, 1996a). The incoming Labour Government has increasingly 
championed the importance of urban design, local distinctiveness and public sector intervention 
in the cause of better design (Carmona, 1999). Indeed, the minister responsible for planning 
 
2  For example, the Government’s own Land Use Change Statistics (LUCS) show that in 1988, of the 7,730 
hectares of land used for residential development in England, 41% or 3169 hectares was previously 
developed. Taking this 1988 figure as an index base (as recommended by LUCS), it is apparent the absolute 
total of previously-developed land used for new housing actually declined during the 1990s, to such an extent 
that the 1998 figure of 2,898 hectares of previously-developed land used for new housing was only 91% of 
the 1988 figure, a decade previously (DTLR, 2001). However, while almost 220,000 new dwellings were 
started in England in 1988, by 1999/2000, this figure had slumped to just under 149,000 new starts (DETR, 
1999 and 2000b). Any apparent improvement in rates of land recycling over the decade was probably due 
more to a decline in the industry’s demand for land and less to the success of policy measures. 
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threatened housebuilders with greater difficulty in securing planning permission unless they were 
willing to invest in higher-quality design (DETR, 2000c). 
 
 
Region Draft RPG*  Final RPG** 
 Date % Date % 
East Anglia August 1998 40 November 2000 50 
South East December 1998 60 March 2001 60 
South West August 1999 36 September 2001 50 
Yorkshire and the Humber October 1999 60 October 2001 60 
East Midlands November 1999 45 February 2002 60 
North East December 1999 60 November 2002 65 
*Produced by regional planning body  **Issued by secretary of state. 
 
Table 1. 'New-style' regional planning guidance (RPG): the proportion of new dwellings 
intended to be built on brownfield land or provided by conversions (Source: Counsell, 2001, 
updated from the website of the )ffice of the Deputy Prime Minister). 
 
To emphasise the increasing importance of well-designed residential environments within 
Government policy guidance, a companion guide to PPG 3 entitled By Design: Better Places to Live 
was published jointly by the DTLR and CABE in 2001. This illustrated how key principles of 
urban design could be applied to create sustainable residential development by: 
 
• Making more efficient use of land; 
• Promoting better accessibility to local facilities and public transport; 
• Supporting crime prevention and community safety; 
• Creating more socially inclusive communities; 
• Promoting energy efficiency. 
 
Two related Government publications also demonstrated how good design principles needed to 
be applied as both greenfield and brownfield locations. Of these, the Urban Design Compendium, 
published English Partnerships and the Housing Corporation (Llewelyn-Davies, 2000), aimed to 
unravel the design qualities of successful urban areas, while By Design: Urban Design in the Planning 
System: Towards Better Practice (DETR and CABE, 2000) explored how better urban design could be 
achieved through best practice in planning. 
 
This increasing political commitment to higher quality urban design in its broadest sense was 
reinforced in both the Urban and Rural White Papers published in 2000. The Urban White Paper 
called for good quality design to be second nature for new development and emphasised the 
importance of design in achieving social, economic and environmental sustainability in new 
housing schemes (DETR, 2000d). Interestingly, the Rural White Paper was more specific on this 
point, commenting that: “New housing is not always well-designed or attractive. Poor housing can 
change the character of a settlement, particularly in a village setting. New housing needs to be 
sympathetically sited and built in a style and use of materials which blend in with the rest of the 
village  . . . Creating better-designed places in a central message of our new planning guidance for 
housing (PPG 3)” (DETR and MAFF 2000, p. 54). 
 
One particular regulatory regime directly affecting housing design and construction concerns 
energy efficiency. Bhatti (1996) argues that the main barriers to more efficient energy use in UK 
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housing are not technological but political and institutional. He suggests that politicians have 
placed too much reliance on market-mechanisms and information campaigns to change prevalent 
attitudes and behaviour and not enough on direct and effective regulation. For example, although 
the building regulations were apparently tightened in 1990 to promote greater energy-efficiency, 
builders were allowed to offset improvements in one area against another, so making it possible 
for the thermal efficiency of walls to be decreased, if double glazing were introduced. Even though 
this loophole was closed in 1995, with overall energy ratings introduced for new dwellings, no 
attempt was made to highlight within final housing costs, the total sum of energy consumed in the 
production of the constituent building materials or to use such information to choose between 
different building types. 
 
According to Barlow and Bhatti (1997), few speculative housebuilders see marketing advantages 
in developing energy-efficient homes, since they consider the payback time too long for their 
additional costs. This view is confirmed by the reaction of many in the sector to the more 
demanding environmental standards introduced in changes to the Part L of the Building 
Regulations in 2002, which are intended to reduce the average annual CO² emissions of a new 
house from 4.5 to 1.5 tonnes. As Smit (2002, p. 17) commented “ Most of the housebuilding 
industry sees the requirements of Part L purely in terms of the £600 to £1,200 it will add to the 
cost of a house. Few are able to exploit insulation, or other advanced green technology such as 
photovoltaic panels or water-saving devices, as a marketing opportunity that could attract buyers.” 
 
Although these latest revisions to the Building Regulations have reduced the energy needed to heat 
a new home by half compared to the 1990 Regulations, the recent Energy White Paper suggests 
that a detached house built to the latest standards in England and Wales still consumes nearly 20% 
more energy than the equivalent house in Denmark (DTI, 2003). The Government has promised 
further revisions to the Building Regulations in 2005 with the intention of progressively raising 
energy efficiency standards over the coming decade. It is intended, for example, that the new 
regulations will encourage developers to use low carbon solutions such as solar heating and 
photovoltaics. 
  
In recent years, planning gain has become an increasingly important means by which local planning 
authorities have sought to manage development pressure through capturing more and more of the 
financial benefits that derive from the re-allocation of land for development. Planning gain can be 
defined as the provision by a developer of some additional benefit, not necessarily related to the 
immediate development, offered to, or more usually requested by a local planning authority (Adams, 
1994). Although in popular use, the term is not found in relevant legislation. Section 75 of the Town 
and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 refers to planning agreements. However, in England and 
Wales, when Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was amended by the Planning 
and Compensation Act 1991, planning obligations replaced the term planning agreements, south of 
the border. 
 
According to Campbell et al. (2000), the use and scope of planning obligations significantly widened 
during the 1990s. They calculated that, between 1993 and 1998, the proportion of English planning 
permissions accompanied by planning obligations rose by about 40%. This they attributed to the 
austere financial environment in which local authorities now operate. As a result, planning obligations 
are now widely employed as an important mechanism by which financial responsibility for the 
provision of off-site infrastructure, facilities and services can be shifted from government to building 
producers and consumers. 
 
In residential development, planning obligations are increasingly used by local authorities to extract 
some contribution from private developers (in cash and/or in kind) towards the provision of 
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affordable housing. The current English policy approach is set out in Circular 6/98  (DETR, 
1998b) and PPG 3 (DETR, 2000a) and is based on negotiation with developers on a site-by-site 
basis. Circular 6/98 encourages local authorities to require the provision of affordable housing on 
sites over one hectare or 25 plus dwellings (0.5 hectares or 15 plus in London). This usually involves 
land handed over to a registered social landlord free of charge but may mean developer's contribution 
to low-cost housing elsewhere in local authority area. Failure to contribute could justify the refusal 
of planning permission since, as PPG 3 makes clear, the provision of affordable housing can be a 
material consideration in determining planning applications. In this context, PPG 3 requires local 
authorities to define what is affordable, conduct housing needs surveys, determine how many 
affordable homes need to be provided, and identify the amount to be sought from developers 
(given that some will still be secured through the provision of social housing grant). 
 
While Campbell et al. (2000) suggested that only about 1.5% of English planning applications as a 
whole have a planning obligation attached to them, this proportion rose to almost 17% in the cases 
of major forms of development and to almost 26% for major residential development. From a 
sample of over 500 separate planning obligations, they found an important change in the nature 
of planning obligations from an earlier emphasis on on-site works such as environmental 
enhancement and the provision of open space towards off-site infrastructure such as major 
highway improvements in the locality. At a more general level, developers were increasingly 
expected to contribute to civic amenities, public art, commuted sums for park and ride schemes 
and other forms of wider community benefits, rather than merely to reduce the impact of the 
specific development. The rationale for planning obligations has thus been broadened from that 
of merely seeking to mitigate development impacts and remove development constraints to “the 
amelioration of more diffuse social, economic and environmental impacts and to the pursuit of 
wider policy objectives” (Campbell et al., 2000, p. 766). 
 
Barlow and King (1992, p. 381) comment that “… ‘regulation’ does not refer to a single set of 
legislative decisions. Rather, regulation of most housing systems has arisen through a series of 
unrelated acts, bounding the market in specific ways and producing a specific competitive 
rationale.” In this sense, speculative housebuilders now find their activities constrained by a much 
tighter regulatory regime created as the combined consequence of a series of loosely linked policy 
changes, rather than as a result of single policy decision. Nevertheless, two substantive themes 
connect what may appear to be separate government initiatives and help explain why state-market 
relations in housebuilding have begun to shift significantly in recent years. 
 
First, over a period of 20 to 25 years, the state’s perceived role in housing provision, as in so many 
other areas of social policy, has been transformed from that of provider to facilitator. Speculative 
housebuilders have thus been required to help fill financial gaps that would otherwise exist in the 
provision of affordable housing, infrastructure investment and similar types of communal goods, 
where reduced state support had created supply deficiencies. Much controversy, however, 
surround the likely effectiveness of such reliance on the private sector. For example, according to 
Barlow et al. (2002, p. 7) “… too much weight is being placed on the additional affordable housing 
that can be expected to be made available through section 106 agreements. While the use of 
planning agreements for appropriate socially beneficial purposes is to be welcomed, it cannot on 
its own deliver a sufficient amount of affordable housing to meet current and emerging needs. . .” 
 
The contested discourse of sustainable development provides the second substantive theme 
linking many recent regulatory changes that directly affect speculative housebuilding. It is difficult 
to know whether human activities are becoming more or less sustainable without formal means of 
measurement. Numerous attempts have therefore been made to develop sustainability indicators 
at local, national and international levels. An early list of 150 such indicators was published by the 
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World Bank and UN Centre for Human Settlements (World Bank, 1994). Shortly afterwards, the 
UK produced its own first national list of sustainability indicators (DOE, 1996b). After the change 
of Government in 1997, revisions to this list were suggested in order more fully to reflect the social 
aspects of sustainability (DETR, 1998c). As a result, progress towards sustainable development in 
the UK is now measured by a broad set of about 150 indicators and particularly, by a subset of 15 
headline indicators, shown in Table 2 (DETR, 1999b and DEFRA, 2003). 
 
 
• Total output of the economy (GDP and GDP per head) 
• Total and social investment as a percentage of GDP 
• Proportion of people of working age who are in work 
• Percentage of working-age people without qualifications or in workless households 
• and percentage of children living in families with relatively low income 
• Qualifications at age 19 years 
• Expected years of healthy life 
• Percentage of households living in nondecent housing 
• Crimes per 100 000 of population 
• Emissions of greenhouse gases 
• Days when air pollution was moderate or higher 
• Total road traffic volume 
• Rivers of good or fair chemical quality 
• Populations of wild birds 
• New homes on previously developed land 
• Household waste, all arisings, and management 
 
Table 2. Headline indicators of sustainable development for the United Kingdom (source: 
DEFRA, 2003; DETR, 1999b). 
 
Although it is now widely accepted that the sustainability of a city is related to its shape, size, 
density and uses, the exact nature of that relationship remains a matter of considerable dispute. 
“Certain urban forms appear to be more sustainable in some respects, for example in reducing 
travel, or enabling fuel efficient technologies, but detrimental in others, perhaps in harming 
environmental quality or producing social inequalities” (Williams et al., 2000, p. 1). While this points 
to the existence of a range of urban forms that would be more sustainable than recent development 
patterns, Williams et al. (2000) suggest that their key characteristics are likely to be compactness, 
mix of uses and interconnected street patterns, supported by strong public transport networks, 
environmental controls and high standards of urban management. 
 
In seeking to apply these characteristics, there remains much room for debate on whether 
sustainable urban forms are best achieved through centralised or decentralised concentrations of 
people and especially on the extent to which urban intensification and densification is a pre-
requisite of sustainable development. New homes can be designed on many greenfield sites, for 
example, to provide quality surroundings with low noise and excellent access to local green space, 
to maximise energy efficiency while reducing household waste and to minimise traffic congestion 
while encouraging children to walk to school. Although such developments may fail the 
Government’s headline test of not being built on previously developed land, Table 3 suggests that 
it would be hard to label them as unsustainable simply on the basis of their location. Thus, while 
the language of sustainability can be used simply to resist pressures for housing development 
(Lambert and Boddy, 1998), it can equally be employed to argue for the creation of sustainable 
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residential communities on greenfield land. Indeed, since there will be cases where greenfield 
development would provide a more sustainable housing solution (Barlow et al., 2002), it is 
important not to reduce discussion of the sustainability of new housing development merely to 
matters of location. 
 
 
• Access to local green space 
• Community spirit 
• Energy efficiency of new domestic appliances 
• Energy use per household 
• Household waste and recycling 
• Household water use and peak demand 
• How children get to school 
• Noise levels 
• Quality of surroundings 
• Traffic congestion 
 
Table 3. Some nonheadline indicators of sustainable residential development (source: 
DETR, 1999b). 
 
Nevertheless by ‘headlining’ new homes on previously developed land as one of the most 
important environmental indicators, the Government created “a new policy dynamic, in which 
debate about responses to household growth has been dominated and polarised by arguments 
about the appropriate brownfield percentage and wrangles over exactly what we mean by 
‘brownfield’ ” (Levett, 1998, p. 4).  Although it is a gross over-simplification to consider brownfield 
development always sustainable and greenfield development always unsustainable, the substantial 
shift which has taken place in the regulatory environment for British housebuilding is perhaps best 
encapsulated in the Government’s determination to see more and more new homes built on 
brownfield sites.   
 
This shift is of course but one component of the changing institutional context for speculative 
housebuilding. In an increasingly affluent age, for example, consumers are requiring better-quality 
designs and environments from housebuilders and seeking higher standards of customer service. 
Again, demographic changes coupled with competition and diversification within the financial 
services sector means that housebuilders now operate in a very different institutional context for 
housing demand than 20 years ago. As these various trend make clear, the institutional and 
regulatory environment for British housebuilding is certainly in a period of rapid evolution, if not 
revolution. Some housebuilders may conceive of this as highly problematic, while others may 
regard it as an opportunity to capture new forms of business and even dominate new types of 
market. How then is the structure of UK housebuilding likely to evolve in response to its rapidly 
changing external environment? And how might that response in turn feed back into policy 
evaluation? The breath of these questions makes it necessary to focus on one main aspect of 
enquiry in a paper of this length.  
 
In this regard, this paper concentrates on how the intended policy switch to brownfield 
development is likely to require fundamental changes in the private housing development process. 
To set this discussion in context, however, the next section introduces some general ideas about 





3. BUSINESS STRATEGY, CORE COMPETENCIES AND CAPTURING 
OPPORTUNITY SHARE 
 
All businesses operate within the context of relentless external change. When this change is 
gradual, it may persuade firms merely to engage in a steady process of evolution. In contrast, 
fundamental shifts in the external context for business activity are likely to require strategic changes 
in business direction. Such fundamental shifts may be attributable, for example, to rapid changes 
in technology, collapse in export markets or, as examined in this paper, a far-reaching 
transformation in the relevant regulatory environment. Some firms may view radical external 
change as a problem, while others are likely to regard it as a significant opportunity. It is therefore 
instructive to turn to the strategic management literature to discover how speculative 
housebuilders might best respond to, or indeed anticipate, the fundamental change now apparent 
in the framework by which the sector is regulated. 
 
According to Hamel and Prahalad (1994), competition for the future is intrinsically different from 
competition for the present. No business should regard the future as a simple extrapolation of the 
past. Tomorrow’s mass markets may seem mere niche markets today. The companies likely to 
become tomorrow’s industry leaders will be those that can identify and prepare for revolutionary 
business change by identifying new markets and by shifting consumer preference in established 
markets. Successful businesses thus engage in strategic planning to ensure their continued 
prosperity in competitive markets that are by nature risky and uncertain. 
 
In speculative housing production, short-term elasticity of housing supply combined with a 
relatively elastic demand curve creates a highly unstable business environment, which is 
characterised by highly variable profits streams for developers (Barlow and King, 1992). Since the 
parameters of risk and uncertainty in housing markets are strongly heavily influenced by the 
characteristics of the regulatory framework, significant changes in that framework will require 
firms to re-assess their competitive strategies. This accords with the view of Leonard-Barton (1998) 
that companies are most in danger when technological, political or social changes ‘shift the ground’ 
from underneath them. In such circumstances, companies may be reluctant to ‘cannibalise’ 
markets that still appear profitable or to dispense with well-established practices and technologies, 
while alternatives still seem uneconomic. It is thus pertinent to note that Barlow and King (1992) 
attribute what they consider to be the widespread conservatism in British speculative 
housebuilding to the high degree of risk inherent in the business, which tempts companies to 
retreat into well-tried strategies and entrenched positions. From the more general management 
stance, Leonard-Barton (1998) argues that companies that do not continuously invest in the 
acquisition of new knowledge and the development of new capabilities will yield ground to smaller 
competitors who are keen to develop new technology and break into new markets. Once the 
realisation dawns that others are better placed to exploit emerging opportunities, companies that 
have failed to invest in updating their core capabilities will have to resort to painful, disruptive and 
less efficient methods of doing so, if they are to survive.  
 
These insights connect well with the work Hamel and Prahalad (1994) who claim that competition 
between businesses for the future is all about ‘opportunity share’ in contrast to competition for 
the present, which is concerned with market share. Emerging opportunity arenas are intrinsically 
speculative since even the rules of engagement have yet to be determined. Strategies to capture 
opportunity share need therefore to be driven by the prospect of making an impact rather than by 
the certitude of immediate financial returns. Such long-term strategies are centrally concerned with 
competing for tomorrow’s industry structure, rather than within today’s industry structure. 
According to Hamel and Prahalad (1994), the companies most likely to succeed in winning future 
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opportunity share, and thus protecting the long-term future of their business, are those who invest 
heavily in what they call core competencies. 
 
Although this concept is widely deployed across the management literature, different authors use 
different terms including ‘distinctive competences’, ‘core or organisational competencies’, ‘firm-
specific competence’, ‘resource deployments’ and ‘invisible assets’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
However, the essential nature of the concept is often left unexplained since “Writers often assume 
that descriptors of core capabilities such as ‘unique’, ‘distinctive’, ‘difficult to imitate’ or ‘superior 
to competition’ render the term self-explanatory, especially if reference is also made to ‘resource 
deployment’ or ‘skills’” (Leonard-Barton, 1992, p. 112). Leonard-Barton herself prefers the 
contribution of Teece et al., (1990, p. 28) who define core capabilities as “a set of differentiated 
skills, complementary assets, and routines that provide the basis for a firm’s competitive capacities 
and sustainable advantage in a particular business.” On this basis, Leonard-Barton (1992, p. 113) 
identifies four dimensions to the knowledge-set that distinguishes each company and provides a 
competitive advantage. She suggests that “Its content is embodied in (1) employee knowledge and 
skills and embedded in (2) technical systems. The processes of knowledge creation and control are 
guided by (3) managerial systems. The fourth dimension is (4) the values and norms associated with the 
various types of embodied and embedded knowledge creation and control” (Italics in original). 
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) contend that firms that wish to gain a disproportionate share of future 
profits must develop a disproportionate share of requisite competencies. They liken this process 
to investing in options, which is necessary to prevent the foreclosure of market opportunities, but 
which is by nature speculative since some options will never be exploited. Nevertheless, successful 
firms pre-emptively build what they consider will be the core competencies of the future, aware 
that these will make a disproportionate contribution to future customer value. In some areas, this 
will require competencies that already exist within the companies to be strengthened but in many 
others the future prosperity of the company will depend on the patient and persistent accumulation 
of intellectual capital. Those companies that fail to do so are likely to be left behind since, as Hamel 
and Prahalad (1994, p. 220) argue “It is difficult to get on board the competence-building train 
once it’s left the station.” Competence building therefore proceeds as a process of cumulative 
learning rather than in great leaps of inventiveness. 
 
This is an essentially behavioural approach to understanding corporate competition and change 
since it conceptualises firms in relation to their strategic capabilities and emphasises the 
organisational practices and business processes that support those capabilities (Stalk et al., 1992). 
Rather than build business strategy around structure and product, Stalk et al. (1992) argue that an 
emphasis on the infrastructure that supports and enhances capabilities will bestow significant 
competitive advantage by enabling firms to focus on what they do best while still allowing 
considerable potential for diversification. One conclusion of their case study, which examines the 
rapid early expansion of the Wal-Mart chain in the USA, may be of particular interest to research 
on British housebuilding. Specifically, they suggest that a capabilities-led approach to business 
strategy would caution against growth by corporate acquisition or geographical expansion, and 
look instead to rapid entry into whole new businesses to achieve big-payoffs. In the context of this 
paper, it is important to regard brownfield housing development not as a mere geographical 
expansion of greenfield development but as an intrinsically different market concept. 
 
As a final but perhaps darker component of this literature, Leonard-Barton (1998) introduces the 
concept of core rigidities that can be considered to represent the opposite of core capabilities or 
competencies. Interestingly, however, there is no clear dichotomy between capabilities and 
rigidities since over time core capabilities can become so ossified that they degenerate into core 
rigidities, evident in deeply embedded knowledge or value sets that hamper innovation. Companies 
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characterised more by core rigidities than by core competencies will be forced out of markets by 
others who have acquired the knowledge on how to serve customers more effectively. In this 
context, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) suggest that successful firms will demonstrate the confidence 
and capability of ‘learning to forget’. In other words, they will be prepared to move on from 
technologies and practices that have served the company well in the past (and even if they are still 
producing returns today) and anticipate the competencies that are most likely to serve the company 
well in the future. In such an enterprise, management attitudes and culture is at the heart of 
challenging or reinforcing core rigidities for according to Leonard-Barton (1998), it is the pervasive 
dimension of ingrained values and norms that empower core rigidities. As a result, radical and 
painful correction may be the only way to save a company where core rigidities need to be 
overcome as a pre-requisite to fresh strategic thinking. 
 
These ideas provide an important context within which to review the changing business strategies 
of British speculative housebuilders. As this paper suggests, the changing regulatory environment 
within which housebuilders operate demands a new set of core competencies or at the very least, 
significant refinements of existing competencies. Such a challenge may generate a period of fresh 
structural turbulence for the sector as some firms demonstrate greater capacity to adapt than 
others. The next section will therefore briefly review how the inherent organisation of speculative 
housebuilding reflects a more relaxed regulatory stance on greenfield development than is now the 
case. From this, it will be possible in the following section to consider some of the distinctive 
competencies in which housebuilders will need to invest to be successful in the brownfield 
development process. 
 
4. CONVENTIONAL BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN SPECULATIVE 
HOUSEBUILDING  
 
Speculative housebuilders play a pivotal role in the structure of building provision for owner-
occupied housing in the UK. According to Ball (1998, p. 1513) “A structure of building provision 
refers to the contemporary network of relationships associated with the provision of particular 
types of building at specific points in time”. For owner-occupied housing, the network of 
organisations involved in its structure of provision extend well beyond speculative housebuilders 
to include material suppliers, subcontractors, professional consultants, banks, building societies 
and other financiers. Ball argues that each structure of provision (for houses, offices etc) is unique 
since it is associated with historically specific institutional and other social relations. He suggests 
that structures of provision are characterised by continual change since, over time, organisational 
strategies will be reviewed and tastes, technologies and policies will alter. Since this process may 
not necessarily lead to efficiency improvements, it should be regarded as weakly evolutionary and 
certainly not deterministic. Thus “At any point in time, however, there may be no contemporary 
rationale for the existence of a particular structure of organisation, institutions and markets – it 
just happens to be there (although it has a history and a future)” (Ball, 1998, p. 1514). 
 
This section examines the organisation of speculative housebuilding and explores how the 
previous focus of housebuilders on greenfield development generated a particular form of business 
strategy (in which more profit could potentially be made from land dealing than from 
construction), which is not readily adaptable to brownfield development. Although discussion 
does not extend in the space available to other types of organisation within the structure of 
provision for owner occupied housing, it is recognised that the policy shift to brownfield 
development may well call, for example, for new approaches in the building supply chain or in 
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mortgage finance3. Indeed, as Hooper and Nicol (1999, p. 805) comment “At a time when the 
potential for change through new construction technologies and production processes has never 
been greater, it would be a pity if new urban settlement forms were to be predicated on outmoded 
structures of provision.”  
 
Although there are about 18,000 housebuilders registered with the National House Building 
Council (NHBC), speculative production of new homes is dominated by a small number of major 
companies, each with an annual output of 500 units or more. In 2000, there were 43 such 
companies in the UK who together accounted for almost 71% of all the homes built by the sector 
(Wellings, 2001). Earlier figures from the NHBC’s Private Housebuilding Statistics, reported by 
Nicol and Hooper (1999), indicate that in 1990 there were 32 companies starting 500 or more units 
who together claimed a 41% market share, while the returns for 1980 revealed only 24 such 
companies with a 39% market share. Nicol and Hooper (1999) therefore contend that there has 
been a long-term trend towards increased concentration of housebuilding capital, at least in terms 
of unit output4. 
 
Those companies completing an average of 2,000 or more dwellings each year are often termed 
volume or mass housebuilders. In 2000, there were 14 such companies in comparison with 8 in 
1990 and only 4 in 1980. The market share of the top ten builders by unit output, which in 1990 
had stood at 26%, rose inextricably throughout the decade and was estimated to have reached 44% 
by 2001 (Wellings, 2001). Although other measures of market share such as turnover or number 
of employees may also be valid (Monk, 1991), unit output has been widely used to assess the 
growing concentration of capital in the sector. Indeed, eight of the top ten housebuilders by unit 
output in 2000 re-appear in the top ten rankings by both turnover and profitability for that year 
(Wellings, 2001). Although there may well be important regional or local variations in the extent 
to which housebuilding is dominated by relatively few companies (Gibb, 1999), it is apparent that, 
at a UK level, the sector is becoming more rather than less concentrated. 
 
The increasing importance of large housebuilding capital was originally noticed by Ball (1983) who 
showed that builders with an output of over 250 units a year doubled their share of the market 
from 25% to 50% during the 1970s. He explained the relative growth of larger producers by their 
ready access to finance capital, often supplied by parent companies. In contrast, small and medium-
sized producers were dependent for finance on the banks, which restricted the availability of capital 
especially during cyclical downturns. According to Ball (1983) such financial constraints prevented 
small and medium-sized builders from taking advantage of booms and slumps in the same way as 
the larger companies who had the ability to acquire greenfield land cheaply during periods of slump 
and, as a result, were well-placed to sell houses early in a boom. As Gibb et al. (1995, p. ix) argue 
in a Scottish context, “the difficulty of buying land limits competition by restricting entry of new 
 
3  In this context, it is instructive to note a finding of recent research commissioned by the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders: “For mortgage lenders, the key issue relates to the valuation of housing built on brownfield, mixed-
use and mixed-tenure sites. Public perceptions of the desirability of home built on more marginal brownfield 
land could detrimentally affect its future value. Lenders need to collaborate closely with housebuilders and 
relevant public sector bodies in the pre-acquisition phases of ‘difficult’ sites, in order to avoid later valuation 
and marketability problems” (Barlow, 2000, p. vii). 
4  This trend towards increased concentration is most recently evident in what one commentator described as 
the rise in 2001 of the ‘super builder’, capable of an annual output of at least 10,000 units (Simpkins, 2001). 
This was sparked by an intended merger between Beazer and Bryant, which was overtaken by separate bids 
for each company. As a result of these, Beazer was acquired by its rival Persimmon for £610 million, while 
Bryant was taken over by Taylor Woodrow for £613 million. Later that year, Wimpey bought Alfred 
McAlpine Homes from Alfred McAlpine PLC for £461 million. According to Simpkins (2001), this 
consolidation of some of the biggest names in UK housebuilding was driven by the City’s demand for better 
capitalised and funded housebuilding companies, that were not dominated by a single entrepreneur but able 
to produce consistent and stable earnings (Simpkins, 2001). 
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firms to the market.” This may have significant implications for the local economy for as Barlow 
and Ball (1999, p. 7) argue “If building is limited, either by planning restraint or by a small number 
of firms controlling the development pipeline, then house prices in a locality are likely to rise.” 
 
For speculative housebuilders, land is an essential raw material that needs to be controlled well 
before construction is due to start. At the minimum, sites are normally held in a land bank for a 
two to three period prior to the planned commencement of on-site production (Smyth, 1984)5. 
Within such a land bank portfolio, most housebuilders normally seek to control land by option or 
conditional contract until planning permission is certain and only then, to complete acquisition of 
the freehold. Options and conditional contracts enable housebuilders to commit only limited 
resources to land acquisition before planning permission is secure. In the meantime, substantial 
professional fees may need to be incurred in hiring lawyers and consultants to negotiate the passage 
of such land through the often protracted process of planning applications, planning appeals and 
development plan inquiries. 
 
Although the amount of land held under option or conditional contract within housebuilders’ 
portfolios is generally many times that owned freehold (Adams, 1994), significant potential still 
exists for housebuilders to benefit from any inflationary gains in land value between freehold 
purchase of the site and the eventual sale of the completed dwellings. Even at a time of lower 
general inflation, there are still profits to be made from the practice of land banking in an active 
housing market. According to Wellings (2000), housebuilders were able to make excess stock 
profits in the late 1990s mainly because house price inflation had been greater than anticipated. 
“Take away the inflation and the stock profit goes. This may take time to materialise as old land 
still generates healthy profits, but as the more recent land works its way through it is inevitable 
that trading margins will come under pressure” (Wellings, 2000, p. 8).  
 
As a result of the high cost of land relative to the selling prices of completed dwellings coupled 
with the high historic volatility of real land prices, much greater attention has been accorded in the 
UK than elsewhere in Europe to the financial gains and losses that potentially arise while land is 
banked. The increasing ‘politicisation’ of the planning process in the UK coupled with the absence 
of any effective mechanism for managing land supply has created intense competition for potential 
development sites in areas of high demand and significantly empowered and rewarded landowners 
(Barlow, 1999). This has made the period of time over which land is held between its freehold 
purchase and the eventual sale of the completed dwellings an essential ingredient in the profitability 
of speculative housebuilders. Although housebuilders in the UK had to cope with substantial write-
downs in land value after the housing market slump of the early 1990s, for most of the postwar 
period, they were able to benefit significantly from inflationary increases in the value of land they 
held freehold. As Barlow (1999, p. 23) claims, “From the 1960s to the late 1980s their main 
business strategy focused on capturing inflationary gains from housing and land markets.”  
 
While the emergence of a neo-liberal regulatory framework encouraged British housebuilders to focus 
their business strategies on short-term development gains, Barlow and Duncan (1994) demonstrate 
that this has not been typical within a European context. For example, they show that Swedish 
housebuilders have been able to concentrate much more on product and process innovation, as public 
land banking in Sweden has traditionally ensured a steady supply of cheap building land. Moreover, 
 
5 According to Ball (1983, p. 148) “A useful way of conceptualising the nature of a housebuilder’s land bank is to treat 
it as a portfolio of land just as a commercial bank or other financial institution has a portfolio of assets. In both cases, 
the portfolios consist of a spread of high-yielding but potentially risky assets (in the builder’s case these will usually be 
sites of white land) and safer but less profitable assets that can ensure a steady cash flow and corporate stability. 
Portfolios also have a temporal profile consisting of assets with different dates of maturity and profit realization. In 
general, a land bank portfolio spreads risks and takes the pain out of speculation.” 
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as Ball et al. (1988) explain, contractors in France, Germany and the Netherlands rather than 
speculative developers have traditionally dominated the provision of new owner-occupied housing in 
those countries. Indeed, “Speculative house-builders, as simultaneously builders and developers, are 
in the European context a specifically British phenomenon and their existence relates to particular 
social conditions at the period when owner-occupation initially expanded (Ball et al., 1988, p. 102). 
Moreover, in comparing housing land policies traditionally pursued in the UK and the Netherlands, 
Golland (1996) contends that the Dutch experience of housing production demonstrates the 
advantages of a more regulated system of land supply in reducing risk and ensuring the production 
of new housing to meet changing levels of demand. 
 
Competition between UK housebuilders has thus focussed around what Barlow and King (1992) 
describe as the soft issues of land and opportunity identification rather than the more challenging 
ones of production process and product terms. They argue that this both reflects the particular form 
of state-market relations prevalent in British housebuilding and largely accounts for the sector’s 
historic poor performance and reputation. It is thus apparent that: “Speculative strategies, while 
enabling high-profits to be made in the short term (although disastrous losses are equally possible), 
result in unstable production levels and a lower quality, often poor value for money, product. The 
housing production system remains overly vulnerable to outside changes with economically and 
socially wasteful boom-slump patterns as one result” (Barlow and Duncan, 1994, p. 151). 
 
In the next section, I argue that since the residential development process is distinctively different 
at brownfield locations compared to greenfield ones, it will require housebuilders to develop new 
business strategies and specifically to invest in the new core competencies needed to exploit 
emerging market opportunities. As explored in the following section, while the changing regulatory 
environment for UK housebuilding explicitly demands a locational shift in new development, it 
thus implicitly implies a substantial ‘shake-up’ in the modus operandi of speculative housebuilders.  
 
5. BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT: THE CHALLENGE FOR 
HOUSEBUILDERS 
 
According to Black (1997), speculative housebuilding has been characterised by its commitment 
to a manufacturing rather than a design process, its minimal interest in the public realm, its disdain 
for urban design and local consultation and its build and walk away trading ethos. In one sense, 
this is indeed a harsh judgement on a sector that has made a significant contribution to the growth 
of home ownership and economic prosperity over several decades. In another sense, however, it 
summarises all the worst features of the greenfield housing on which the sector has built both its 
fortunes and its reputation. 
 
If speculative developers are to make a significant contribution to brownfield redevelopment, it is 
apparent that new competencies and strategies will be required. The problematic nature of many 
brownfield locations, for instance, means that developers will need to deliver value added directly 
from housing products rather than rely on gaining profits from inflation in land prices. 
Housebuilders will also need to develop greater skills in integrating with and supporting local 
communities rather than in merely constructing housing estates. Much higher standards of urban 
design are likely to be required, not simply to secure planning approval but also to resolve potential 
conflicts within mixed-use schemes. To achieve all of this, partnership will planning authorities 
and with local communities is likely to become the norm rather than the exception. Indeed, as 
Gibb et al. (1995) note, the public sector is likely to play an increasingly important co-ordinating 
role at both greenfield and brownfield locations. As the suggests, the development process at 
brownfield locations is likely to be fundamentally different than that at greenfield locations where 




Most models of the residential development process, at least those that contribute to, or draw on 
the American literature (see, for example, Weiss et al., 1966; Kaiser & Weiss 1970) are constructed 
around the conversion of greenfield land to new housing estates. In such models, housing demand 
is primarily driven by economic growth and demographic change to the extent that the outward 
expansion of urban residential areas is seen as both a source and a reflection of a prosperous 
society. In contrast, models that seek to capture the essentials of brownfield redevelopment are 
more likely to be policy than market-led, even if such policies operate primarily by seeking to 
influence market decisions, for example, through taxes or subsidies. This is because both the 
immediate and wider development context for brownfield housing development are often highly 
dependent on the activities of, and investment by, the public sector6. 
 
Whether residential development takes place on brownfield or greenfield land, a key component 
of the development process remains that of testing development feasibility. In their classic event-
based model of the development process, Barrett et al. (1978) identified five tests of development 
feasibility, namely physical conditions, ownership, public procedures, market conditions and 
project viability. As this suggests, the three core competencies required to establish development 
feasibility in housebuilding have traditionally been those of knowing how to control ownership 
through land acquisition, secure planning permission and other public consents, and create 
attractive marketing images to pull in customers. Thus, apart from those locations or times of poor 
housing demand, the viability of speculative residential development and indeed the profitability 
of British housebuilding as a whole has depended on finding land at the right price, gaining 
planning permission and marketing the completed product. 
 
Over the years, these three core competencies have been honed and sharpened primarily through 
greenfield experience. In one sense, exactly the same competencies are needed for brownfield 
redevelopment but in another, the very different way in which they need to be applied presents a 
severe test to those housebuilders whose staff have grown up and built their careers primarily on 
greenfield projects. This section therefore look in turn at these three key aspects of the residential 
development process and considers how the brownfield policy switch demands change in the 
traditional competency base in speculative housebuilding. 
  
5.1 Land Acquisition 
 
According to Freeman (2000), the price of brownfield sites is already being driven up by their 
becoming a highly prized counterbalance to greenfield land banks. At a corporate level, Wellings 
(2000, p. 19) argues that since brownfield sites are often more expensive to purchase and develop, 
and cannot, unlike major greenfield locations, be readily parcelled out between different builders, 
“the capital requirements of urban regeneration will drive the industry further towards larger units 
and hence consolidation.” 
 
 
6 In this context, it needs to be understood that that the Government’s 60% brownfield housing land target 
clearly implies a broadening of demand for new urban housing from specific social groups to more general 
sections of the population who have been at the forefront of past residential decentralisation. Recognising 
this, the Urban Task Force (1999, pp. 35–36) commented that: “For many people, the crunch comes with 
having children. An urban environment previously perceived as diverse and stimulating starts to appear 
unsafe. Schools and health services become more important. While it is therefore accepted that, at this stage 
in their life cycle, many people will continue to move to more suburban or small town environments, we 
must look to persuade more families to stay. This means looking beyond the design, planning and building 
of the urban environment at the role played by health, education, security and social services.” As this 




Brownfield land acquisition presents speculative housebuilding with a new challenge to its tried 
and tested methods of acquisition for four main reasons. First, the very nature of brownfield sites 
with their history of previous uses often results in abnormal site preparation costs, making 
development appraisal even more uncertain than usual. Secondly, brownfield landowners are 
unlikely to grant lengthy options or conditional contracts, allowing housebuilders time to bargain 
with planning authorities. Thirdly, if brownfield sites need to be pieced together from parcels in 
different ownerships, acquisition can be very protracted. Finally, for many housebuilders, 
brownfield land markets remain a relatively unknown arena in which contacts, networks and 
practices may need to be built up before large-scale entry. As these reasons imply, housebuilders’ 
land buyers with experience of only greenfield development will need to be re-skilled, if they are 
to operating effectively in brownfield land markets.  
 
5.2 Planning Permission 
 
Although Government policy favours brownfield housing development, planning permission is 
not necessarily easier to obtain on brownfield sites than on greenfield ones. There are two main 
reasons for this. In the first place, local planning authorities often desire to maintain a balance of 
uses within urban areas and can be particularly reluctant to accede to the redevelopment of former 
industrial land for non-employment uses. As the Urban Task Force commented (1999, p. 202) 
“Too many local planning authorities are still practising rigid adherence to employment land 
allocations, for sites with no demand, and in some cases, no suitability, for modern employment 
uses.” On this basis, the Managing Director of Strategic Land Management at Britain’s largest 
housebuilder, Wimpey, was quoted as lambasting the planning system for not enabling the 
company to build more than 40% of its output on brownfield land. He argued that “We could do 
a lot more if the planning system would just get out of the way” (Dewar, 2000). 
 
Secondly, as Pratt and Larkham (1996) point out, residential intensification within cities is liable to 
generate local opposition where it is perceived to impair residential amenities, encourage 
overlooking or produce increased traffic. Certainly, neighbouring residents often resent the 
intensification of low-density mature suburbia, especially where the replacement of single houses 
by blocks of flats leads to a loss of trees and other vegetation. Very real concern therefore exists 
in urban communities that increased urban housing development reflects a policy of town 
cramming rather than town planning (Williams, 1999). Since the task of fitting new development 
into existing urban areas is more challenging than building on greenfield land, housebuilders may 
well need to develop fresh skills and approaches to convince planning authorities and local 
communities that their proposed brownfield developments, even if welcome in principle, represent 
a worthwhile contribution to the quality of urban life rather than a mere translation of the 
greenfield development model to a brownfield location. 
 
5.3 Marketing Strategies 
 
Housebuilders have become highly skilled in the marketing images they portray for their greenfield 
development sites, which often centre on the “mythical golden family” located on the “estate fit 
for a fantasy of traditional living” (Glancey, 1997). Such suburban marketing images have become 
deeply ingrained within speculative housebuilders and can be traced back to the 1930s and beyond. 
In 1916, for example, the promoters of the plotlands development at Peacehaven, described it as 
set in a most charming and delightful estate on the South Coast (Hardy and Ward, 1984). 
 
While such images can be readily caricatured in an almost comical way, the reason they have such 
powerful resonance within the British psyche is that they readily connect with a longstanding desire 
to escape the city and live in the countryside. According to a Countryside Commission survey 
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undertaken in England in 1997, 51% of inner city residents and 43% of those living in city suburbs 
would prefer to live in a village or in the countryside. The main appeal of such rural locations was 
seen as the greenery of the countryside, the traditional nature of the buildings and the pattern of 
social relationships (Champion, 2000). 
 
Quite different approaches and quite different images will be needed for brownfield locations set 
in the midst of urban complexity. Standardised product ranges (see Hooper and Nicol, 1999), are 
unlikely to suffice, not only because brownfield sites will require careful individual design, but also 
because the milieu of potential urban purchasers, with their social and economic diversity, is 
unlikely to be satisfied with a narrow and inflexible product range. The challenge that some 
housebuilders such as Berkeley and Bellway have taken up, is not simply to transfer greenfield 
images to brownfield locations, but rather to realise that entirely new marketing concepts will be 
required which fully appreciate that the nature of both the clientele and the purchase have changed 
significantly. On the one hand, as the early experience of converting redundant office and 
warehouse space for residential accommodation shows, it is important to create marketing images 
that successfully combine the attractiveness of an urban lifestyle with the distinctive qualities of 
the particular development for sale. On the other hand, the emergent nature of brownfield housing 
markets makes it even more essential to develop strong customer relations and to build a 
reputation for effective customer support.  
 
As this section has demonstrated, speculative housebuilders are faced with the challenge of re-
focussing or rebuilding their core competencies in establishing development feasibility, if they are 
to compete successfully in the emerging opportunity arena of brownfield development. While, as 
the next section shows, many housebuilders have already begun to acquire significant experience 
of brownfield development, others have been able still to concentrate on greenfield sites as the 
fundamental source of profitability. However, as a result of the changing regulatory environment 
outlined in Section 2, the locational choice for housebuilders is likely significantly to narrow over 
the coming years, Thus, while it has been possible up to now for many developers to survive by 
relying on the past core competencies of greenfield development, regulatory change is likely to 
turn such competencies increasingly into rigidities and demand that they be at least matched by 
the new knowledge and value sets required for successful brownfield development. 
 
6. SPECULATIVE HOUSEBUILDING: A SUITABLE CASE FOR 
RESTRUCTURING? 
 
Speculative housebuilders in the UK are now operating in a very different regulatory environment 
from even a decade ago. Whether companies regard the new agenda of urban sustainability as a 
problem or an opportunity will depend on the extent to which they have already begun to invest 
in a wholesale transformation of what Leonard-Barton (1998) identifies as the set of employee 
knowledge and skills, technical systems, managerial systems and the values and norms. Unless 
recent regulatory changes represent only a temporary political switch, the long-term survival of the 
UK’s volume housebuilders and even its emerging ‘super-builders’ will be dependent on their 
capacity significantly to adapt the business strategies they have successfully pursued in past decades 
to the policy realities that now confront them. What evidence exists so far of their ability to do so? 
Is it possible that those companies who have grown and prospered in past eras dominated by 
greenfield development will be so constrained by core rigidities that only radical and painful 
correction will be able to save them from decline? 
 
Since brownfield redevelopment has generally been perceived as more problematic and risky than 
new development on greenfield land, it has so far tended to be promoted either by specialist 
companies or specialist subsidiaries of the volume housebuilders. Only three of the 14 volume 
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builders in business in 2000 (Barratt, Bellway and Berkeley) could be considered to be at the 
forefront of urban residential development. Of these, perhaps the most interesting is Berkeley 
which has transformed itself from a greenfield developer to one 90% of whose production is on 
brownfield sites. Its previous approach reflected the land-dealing tactics of most volume builders 
for as Stewart (1995, p. 33) reported, it originally became “a favourite of analysts for having bought 
land cheaply before the last boom, sold at the top of the market and then bought again in the early 
1990s – just before the values started shooting up again.” However, by the late 1990s, it had 
established itself “at the forefront of post recession urban regeneration” (Wellings, 2000, p. 53), 
having become a leading player in both London and provincial city centre schemes. To those who 
consider urban redevelopment unprofitable, it should be noted that, in 2000, Berkeley achieved a 
23% return on capital employed, while seeing its pre-tax profits rise by 20%. Over the period 1994 
to 2000, its asset value per share was the second best among all 18 leading quoted housebuilders. 
 
Several other housebuilders who have begun to take brownfield development seriously, such as 
Crest Nicholson and Fairview appear in the top 25 builders by unit output in 2000. Crest 
Nicholson builds across Southern England and the Midlands, but its activities are concentrated in 
the Home Counties and around Bristol. Fairview, which expanded its output from 620 units in 
1989 to over 2,000 in the mid-1990s, concentrates on low to medium cost housing within the 
Greater London area. It has consistently achieved above average margins (above 30% in 1999) 
through selective brownfield acquisitions in an active housing market. According to Stewart (1995, 
p. 33) its strategy involves “Buying cheap land in derelict inner-city areas and targeting almost cash-
strapped first-time buyers”. 
 
As Wellings (2000) points out, some quite small companies such as Try Homes and County & 
Metropolitan have also played an important role in pioneering brownfield schemes. It may well be 
that most volume builders are waiting for such smaller companies to gain experience from their 
own mistakes, before seeking to take them over and benefit from their experience. Wellings also 
argues that the contractor/housebuilder/property hybrids such as Taylor Woodrow and Miller, 
which that can access a broader range of skills and resources, are better suited to brownfield sites 
than some greenfield volume builders. 
 
One particular core competence that has not traditionally been held or even valued by greenfield 
volume housebuilders but which is likely to prove essential to the success of brownfield schemes 
is quality design. In this context, Carmona (1999) attributes the success of Berkeley Homes, 
Countryside Properties and other more dynamic companies of the 1990s to the greater involvement 
of skilled designers in the housing development process. These companies have been prepared to 
move away from reliance on standard geometric layouts prepared by design technicians and invest 
instead in paying well-regarded architects to design one-off schemes for one-off sites. In the new 
regulatory environment where public consultation is an increasingly important aspect of the planning 
process, Carmona contends that only better quality residential design will achieve public support 
for new housing allocations desired by the speculative housebuilding sector. In this sense, since 
the required ‘upskilling’ in design capacity epitomises the challenge now facing many volume 
builders, the extent to which companies have already invested in higher-quality design may well 




The provision of speculative housing for sale in the UK has become increasingly dominated by a 
small number of very large companies who have built their experience and reputation on a 
particular mode of production that is now threatened by an emerging policy agenda. The 
Government’s determination to switch the balance of new residential development from greenfield 
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to brownfield locations is, however, but one component of the changing regulatory context for 
speculative housebuilding. Other requirements now being placed on housebuilders by the state 
include better design and energy efficient standards and an array of financial demands that 
collectively fall within the scope of planning gain. 
 
It is evident that some volume housebuilding companies have already appreciated the far-reaching 
nature of the regulatory change and begun to chart new business strategies that place them at the 
forefront of brownfield development. It would seem, however, that many other still regard 
brownfield housing as a specialist or limited part of their business and are not investing significantly 
in pre-emptively building the kind of core competencies that would give them a leading edge in 
urban development. In one sense, this is perfectly understandable since there is still plenty of 
greenfield development taking place and it remains less risky and often more profitable than 
brownfield development. However, if the management literature is correct, such firms should 
beware of over-reliance on technologies and practices drawn from an earlier age that may not 
necessarily serve them well in the future. Unless they are prepared to take the chance and invest in 
what they believe to be the necessary competencies of the future, they risk being overtaken by 
their smaller competitors. 
 
From a policy perspective, however, this discussion illustrates the essential inter-relationship 
between structure and agency. For the purposes of the paper, the changing regulatory environment 
has been bestowed with primarily structural characteristics to which individual companies must 
choose how best to react. Of course, in a housing market dependent primarily on private-sector 
provision, the success of the 60% brownfield target depends primarily on the willingness of the 
private sector not merely to accept it with some reluctance but rather to devise innovate ways to 
deliver the policy objectives with some style. Thus what has been presented in the paper as an 
essentially structural characteristic is reliant for its permanence on the extent to which it becomes 
enthusiastically embedded within the strategies, interests and actions of key agents. In this sense, 
policy-makers are not distant spectators but have a vested interest in the rapid development and 
dissemination of core brownfield competencies, even if that can be achieved only by significant 
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